humanity would read these texts composed in the elite language of Sanskrit. Nevertheless, I believe that we should extend the hermeneutic charity of taking the Saivas seriously as intending their work to be of benefit to people outside their tradition. [17] This intention is crucial to the discursive methodology that they develop. The Pratyabhijna Methodology Because the Pratyabhijna sastra attempts to bring about salvation, it is in numerous places described as a spiritual means or path (upaya,marga, patha) . Abhinava describes the Pratyabhijna as a specifically Trika method, as "a means for the goal of the Person who is the Witness, who is none other than Anuttara."[18] Anuttara, 'not having a superior', is one of the important Trika designations for Ultimate Reality. Utpaladeva refers to the means taught by Somananda and himself as a "new, easy path." Abhinava's explanation of the path's novelty is interesting. He states that "[the word] "new" signifies that it is contained in all the sacred texts but not well known because of concealment." [19] Abhinava is here giving the common hermeneutic device of grounding innovation in the implicit or potential significance of a tradition a distinctively tantric character of secrecy. In various places the Pratyabhijna is described specifically as a means working through knowledge (jnanopaya).
[20] The Pratyabhijna thinkers' understanding of the manner in which this means works is remarkably complex. They appropriate procedures of philosophical justification from outside their tradition while at the same time reinterpreting them with their own symbolic and practical resources. [21] In this section I will first present theological and meta-physical considerations adduced by them that in the highest perspective controvert the possibility of any methodology regarding the Supreme Lord. Then I will turn to the Saivas' appropriation of the classic justificatory methods of Nyaya. I will show how, at the same time they utilize these methods of detached rational discourse, they homologize them with procedures of tantric praxis. Negations of Methodology. The Saiva formulations of procedure are immediately interrupted by reflections upon what I would describe--with our own terminology--as a fundamental religious problematic. I would describe this problematic most broadly as the possibility or utility of any finite human behavior, whether linguistic, aesthetic, theological, devotional, ritual, and so on, for expressing, affecting, or attaining a religious Ultimate Reality. [22] For the Pratyabhijna this human-Ultimate "structural" issue has two aspects--coming from its nature as both a theistic and a fully monistic system. First, Siva is the omnipotent deity, responsible for everything that occurs. [23] How can a limited human being bring about identification with Him? Abhinavagupta discusses the familiar questions of divine will, grace, and finite human action in several of his works. He acknowledges that one may consider the most favorable conditions for, or actions of, an aspirant for salvation. At the same time, he states emphatically that in the ultimate perspective salvation is entirely accomplished by the divine will. The favorable conditions do not in any way cause the grace of Siva. [24] Abhinava makes the same argument at various places in the Pratyabhijna texts, although not at length. Thus he takes this issue up when explaining the use of the causative in the gerund "having been caused to attain" (asadya)in Utpaladeva's introductory verse quoted above. Abhinava explains that the Lord does everything. His grace is therefore unattainable even by means of hundreds of wishes. It is because of the obfuscation of its real nature that actual causation by the Lord appears as ordinary observed causal relationships, such as the relation between means and goal (upayopeyabhava), accomplisher and accomplished (nispadyanispadakabhava), and that which makes known and that which is made known (jnapyajnapakabhava).According to Abhinava, the unconditioned nature of the Lord's grace is indicated by the adverb "somehow" (kathamcit) modifying "having been caused to attain." [25] It is to the second aspect of the human-Ultimate structural tension that the Pratyabhijna thinkers devote most of their reflection. At the same time that the Ultimate Reality is understood in "super-" personal terms as the deity Siva, rather than as an impersonal principle, it is understood to contain all reality in a pure unity. If the Ultimate Reality is nondual, the structure and cognitive presumptiveness of its realization must be fundamentally different from ordinary experience, which comprises dichotomies between subject and object, and between different subjects and objects, and takes place as a process in time. It would be impossible for Him to be a mere cognitive object (prameya)established by sastraic discourse. The Saivas develop the Advaita Vedantin concept of self-luminosity (svaprakasatva)to explain how Siva always already has a nondual realization of Himself. [26] Putting their convoluted discussions of this concept in a more linear fashion, the thinkers deny that (1)any cognizer (pramatr)(2) by any means (pramana)could have (3)any cognition (prama, pramiti)or proof (siddhi)--ofwhich the object (prameya)is the Supreme Lord. Like Advaita, they explain the operation of the sastra negatively as only removing the ignorance of this self-luminosity.
[27] The following explanation by Abhinavagupta brings together this point with the other negation of methodology in terms of divine omnipotence; it is the Lord who both creates and removes His self [28] The Pratyabhijna thinkers' denials of the efficacy of human thought and action, like other such qualifications in the world's religions, do not prevent them from engaging in elaborate positive discussions of methodology. These negative formulations may accordingly be taken as "dialectically complicating" their more positive descriptions. What is important for us is that in delimiting their new philosophical procedures from the point of view of Ultimate Reality, the thinkers are from the start carefully preserving their intratraditional integrity. Though the Saiva soteriological realization will be entered into the game of methodologically detached interreligious debate, it is already the winner. Positive Formulations of Methodology: (a)The Pursuit of Universal Intelligibility: The Methodological Standards of Nyaya. It is the Pratyabhijna thinkers' goal of sharing the Trika spiritual vision with all humanity that motivates their development of a philosophical method. For, in order that those outside their tradition may accept it, its validity must be intelligible to them. The Saiva effort in this respect has its parallel in the more rationalistic strain of Western philosophical theology and philosophy of religion. The Catholic theologian David Tracy has analyzed the discourse of philosophical theology, which he calls fundamental theology, in a manner addressing problems of crosscultural/interreligious interpretation and rationality. Philosophical theology is primarily addressed to, follows the standards, and addresses the substantive concerns of the academy. Thus, although it may argue on behalf of a particular religious tradition, it is methodologically detached from the religious and ethical commitments and presumptions regarding truth of other forms of theology (systematicand practical): In terms of modes of argument, fundamental theologies will be concerned principally to provide arguments that all reasonable persons, whether "religiously involved" or not, can recognize as reasonable. It assumes, therefore, the most usual meaning of public discourse: that discourse available (inprinciple) to all persons and explicated by appeals to one's experience, intelligence, rationality and responsibility, and formulated in arguments where claims are stated with appropriate warrants, backings and rebuttal procedures. [29] We may say that in the broad sastraic "academy," there also developed a "philosophy division," analogous to those in the West and other cultures. In this sphere, the diverse schools of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism have attempted to argue for their positions not simply by citing scriptural authority but by using reasoning (yukti,tarka, etc.) . [30] Each school maintained its own "intratraditional" point of view about what it was doing, whether it was apologetics to convert, means to allay the doubts of their own followers, or spiritual exercise. Though differences always remained, there emerged a number of convergences about methods and experiential and rational criteria for philosophical justification spanning the various Indian schools. The most widely accepted argumentative standards in India were those developed by the Nyaya-Vaisesika tradition. Gautama summarized these standards in sixteen categories pertaining to philosophical discussion at Nyaya Sutra 1.1, and these were elaborated with ever greater sophistication in later commentaries.
[31] Though in the truest perspective the Pratyabhijna system does not do anything, when it comes to positive discussions of philosophical methodology, Abhinavagupta asserts that it adheres to the standards of Nyaya: "There is the correctness only of the method of the Naiyayikas in the condition of Maya." [32] He explains the very power of the system to convince others on the basis of its addressing the Nyaya categories: The ultimate purpose in that [sastra] is nothing but [explanation in terms of] the sixteen categories, such as the means of cognition [pramana] , and so on.... When the sixteen categories are articulated [nirupyamanesu] , another is made to understand completely that which is to be understood.
[33] The sixteen Nyaya categories enumerate a variety of concerns which must be addressed in philosophical discussions. They refer to items of different orders and are somewhat overlapping in their significance, including the broad topics of means of knowledge (pramana)and objects of knowledge (prameya),roughly corresponding to our fields of epistemology and ontology; a classification of types of philosophical debates and of the criteria operative in this classification; and an enumeration of the formal requirements of a well-rounded philosophical discussion.
[34] Within the Naiyayikas' own soteriological project, the categories are oriented toward the comprehension of particular objects of knowledge (prameya).Knowledge of and the elimination of error regarding relevant objects of knowledge, particularly as pertaining to what is and is not the true self, leads to detachment and liberation from suffering in rebirth. [35] The Nyaya categories are in various ways explicitly and implicitly addressed in the Pratyabhijna system. However, two categories receive the greatest emphasis in the construction of the Pratyabhijna philosophical method. We will now examine how these categories are appropriated. I will devote the greatest attention to the most important of these, the schema for argument (avayava).Then I will more briefly explain the Saivas' treatment of the Nyaya category of doubt (samsaya).In taking up each category, we will first consider how it is utilized in the Pratyabhijna effort to achieve more universal intelligibility. Then we will observe how the employment of each in the Pratyabhijna is given its deepest significance as spiritual exercise, by its homologization both with earlier patterns of tantric praxis and with a particular classification of praxis developed by Abhinava. In each case I will present only the minimum substance of the Pratyabhijna arguments necessary to get a programmatic understanding of their method; I will give an idea of the actual arguments in the last section. Positive Formulations of Methodology: (b) Philosophical Rationalization with the Nyaya Schema for Argument: Inference for the Sake of Others. The Nyaya category most emphasized by Abhinavagupta is the schema for argument (avayava).This schema presents the steps of the Nyaya 'inference for the sake of others' (pararthanumana) .In Indianthere is a distinction between two types of inference, that for the sake of oneself (svarthanumana)and that for the sake of others. The latter is given a rigorously explicit formulation in order to make logical justification from experiential and conceptual evidence assessable by any critical person. Abhinava explains that sastra "has the nature of an inference for the sake of others (parararthanumana) ." [36] Its intelligibility results directly from its being constructed according to the Nyaya category: What is the purpose with respect to the other? This [work] is for comprehension by the other. And there is that from the inference for the sake of others.... It has been explained by the founder of Nyaya, Aksapada, that every academic text [sastra] apart from scripture really consists of the inference for the sake of others, and [thus] brings about complete comprehension by the other.
[37] I will first outline the Nyaya inference for the sake of others, using the common example of the inference of fire from smoke. This inference has five steps and five terms. [38] In the following, the numbered items are the steps; the other expressions given are the terms. [39] (1)Thesis (pratijna): There is fire on the hill. The hill is the subject (paksa)of the inference. The fire is that which is to be established (sadhya) pertaining to it. (2)Reason (hetu):Because there is smoke. The smoke itself, like the inferential step that invokes it, is also designated with the word 'reason' (hetu). It is a property found in the subject, and known to be concomitant with that which is to be established. As such it is the justification for the inference. (3)General principle with exemplification (udaharana):Where there is smoke there is fire, like in the kitchen and unlike on the lake. This step explains the concomitance underlying the reason. The kitchen is the positive example illustrating the concomitance (sapaksa).The lake is the negative example (vipaksa),showing that the property does not have concomitance with a class wider than that which is to be established. (Thisterm is usually not cited by the Saivas.)(4) Application (upanaya): The hill, because it has smoke on it, has fire on it. This step explicitly asserts that the subject falls within concomitance shown by the previous step. (5) Conclusion (nigamana):Therefore there is fire on the hill. This repeats the thesis as established. We must now get a programmatic understanding of the Pratyabhijna version of this inference abstracted from the technical details of the theories which actually articulate it. The proposition which the Pratyabhijna inference demonstrates is that of the soteriological recognition, that is, that one is identical with the Lord.
[40] The subject (paksa)of the thesis is the person, and what is to be established (sadhya)is that he or she is the Lord. The justification for the connection between the subject and what is to be established is made by the reason step in the inference. This step is supposed to identify a quality (the reason term)in the subject, which is known to be invariably concomitant with that which is to be established. The most distinctive fact known about Siva is expressed in the cosmogonic myth. That is, Siva emanates the universe through His power and consort Sakti, whose identity with Himself is described as sexual union. The reason in the Pratyabhijna inference is precisely that the individual is the actor in the cosmogonic myth of emanation. The Saivas articulate this reason, that the individual is emanator of the universe, through their actual technical philosophical discussions. They also describe it with a variety of ad hoc figurative expressions, some of which will be seen below. However, in programmatic discussions of Pratyabhijna methodology, they give it two chief expressions, which we will take up presently. The first expression of the inferential reason is simply that the individual possesses Sakti. As Utpaladeva states in the second verse of the sastra: This recognition of Him, who though experienced is not noticed due to the force of delusion, is made to be experienced through the revealing of [His] Sakti [saktyaviskarana] . [41] In this formulation, Sakti Herself is the reason as constituent term of the reason step. [42] In technical philosophical discussions, Sakti is often divided into special modalities that designate Siva's emanatory power as operative in the respective spheres of explanation. The two most encompassing forms of Sakti are the Cognition (jnana)Sakti and the Action (kriya)Sakti, which are invoked in the fields roughly corresponding to epistemology and ontology.
[43] These two are further divided into a number of Saktis pertaining to subsidiary topics.
[44] Speaking abstractly, the demonstration that the individual possesses the emanatory Sakti operative in a particular sphere is made by an idealistic reduction of aft its features to modalities of his or her subjectivity. This is brought out in a concise formulation by Utpaladeva: There is the establishment [pratistha] of insentient entities as grounded in living beings [jivadasraya] . The life of living beings is maintained to be the [Saktis of] Cognition and Action.
[45] Abhinavagupta explains that by "living beings" Utpaladeva means subjects (pramatr).These include all apparently limited subjects, from a worm to the gods Brahma and Sadasiva. The system demonstrates that the very existence of objects is the subject's exercise of cognition and action over them. [46] The conception that one is the emanator of the universe, which forms the inferential reason, is also described as a special kind of insight called Pure Wisdom (suddhavidya).Pure Wisdom is the awareness that one is the source emanating all objective reality as identical with oneself. This awareness is given the typical linguistic expression "I am this" (aham idam).
[47] According to Abhinava, the following statement by Utpaladeva explains why this wisdom (vidya)is pure: Things which have fallen to the level of objects of cognition and are understood in the condition of "this" are essentially consciousness [bodha] ; and are [through Pure Wisdom] seen as they really are.
[48] Such knowledge is pure because it is an awareness of the ostensible essential nature of objects as one's emanation.
[49] The third step of the inference states the concomitance of Siva with His character as emanator, that is, Sakti, and so on, and gives examples demonstrating this concomitance. The fourth explicitly asserts that the individual falls within this concomitance. The conclusion reiterates the thesis that the individual is actually the Lord. The entire inference will be further clarified by the presentation and explication of some informal summaries of it by Abhinavagupta. In our first summary, the reason is formulated directly in terms of the Cognition and Action modalities of Sakti. Two supporting examples are mentioned: the Lord Siva Himself, as known in sacred literature, and the king, who like the Lord Siva, knows and acts over all his subjects. Abhinava explains: The subject [pramatr], because he is endowed with the Cognition and Action Saktis, is to be understood [vyavahartavya] as the Lord, like the Lord who is well known in the Puranas, scriptures, and so on. Even if He is not well known [from such texts], Lordship is established to have the nature of the possession of the Cognition and Action Saktis over all objects. For [Lordship] is invariably associated with nothing but these [two Saktis]. Thus the logical concomitance is understood in the case of one such as a king, who is regarded as Lord. Like the king, one is the Lord over so much as one is the cognizer and doer. It is contradictory to the nature of one who is not the Lord to be a cognizer and a doer. And the Self is cognizer and doer with regard to everything. Thus recognition [pratyabhijna] is established. [50] This may be put formally as follows: (1)The subject is the Lord. (2) Because he/she has the Cognition and Action Saktis. (3)Whoever has Cognition and Action Saktis is Lord. Like the Lord known in the Puranas and scriptures, and like the king. (4)The subject, since he/she has them, is the Lord.
(5)The subject is the Lord. The following example is similar to that just given but describes the relationship of individual and universe in terms of dependence: "He who is depended on somewhere is the Lord, like a king over his domain. So does the universe [depend on] you." [51] Formally: (1)You are the Lord. (2) Because the universe depends on you. (3)He/she who is depended on somewhere is the Lord. Like the king over his domain. (4)You, on whom the universe depends, are the Lord. (5)Therefore, you are the Lord. Several expressions by Abhinavagupta do not even mention the Lord as the inferential predicate but establish that the individual has divine status in other ways. Thus the following demonstrates that one is the pervader of the universe because he/she contains it: That in which something manifests is the pervader [vyapakah] of so much, like a casket regarding jewels. The universe, beginning with the earth and ending with Sadasiva, as has been explained by the sastra, [manifests] [Saivi] is explained here to be the door. Dear, just as different places, and so on, are cognized by means of the light of a lamp and the rays of the sun, so is Siva [cognized] by means of Sakti.
[57] The second passage is even more interesting. This passage refers to Siva's character of emanating the world without using the word "Sakti." However, it mentions the two fundamental modalities of Sakti, Cognition and Action, which organize the Pratyabhijna texts: One can become Siva from the firm conviction: "The Supreme Lord is all-cognizer [sarvajna], all-doer [sarvakartr], and pervasive. I, who have the qualities [dharma] of Siva, am none but He. Just as the waves belong to the water, the flames belong to a fire, and light belongs to the sun, these waves[58] of the universe belong to Bhairava, who is none but me." [59] This contemplation is remarkably similar to the later Pratyabhijna inference. One understands oneself as Siva because of having his distinctive character of emanation.
[60] The use of the Nyaya category has only elucidated the "rationality" already contained in a traditional practice. The post-Abhinavagupta commentator Sivopadhyaya, looking backwards through the philosophical interpretation, explicitly identifies this passage as describing the contemplation of Pratyabhijna.
[61] The spiritual significance of the Pratyabhijna inference is not limited to its reenactment of earlier tantric practices. This inference fits within one of the classifications of spiritual means, systematized by Abhinavagupta in his Tantraloka and Tantrasara, called the sakta upaya.
[62] As I have just observed, the commentator Sivopadhyaya identifies the last-quoted passage of the Vijnana Bhairava as describing the contemplation of Pratyabhijna. In the same explanation, he also classifies this contemplation within the sakta upaya.
[63] The two programmatic formulations of the conception that is the reason step in the Pratyabhijna inference, the revealing of Sakti and Pure Wisdom, are in fact the most definitive methodological themes of the sakta upaya. Thus the special importance of the revealing of Sakti in this upaya is indicated by its very name. [64] As Navjivan Rastogi has explained: The element of Sakti permeates all these three in varying measures and is characterized variously as gross, subtle, ultimate, etc., as the case may be. But it is the superabundance of Sakti because of which this Upaya is called Sakta. [68] The sakta upaya is the classification of the means based upon knowledge (jnanopaya) .
[69]We have already observed that the Pratyabhijna system is described as a means of knowledge by both Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. Abhinavagupta thus describes the modus operandi of the sakta upaya gnoseologically as the 'purification of conceptualization' (vikalpasamskara) .The quintessential "tool" of the purification of conceptualization, and thereby of the sakta upaya, is good or true reasoning (sat-tarka) .
[70]Reasoning was increasingly seen as a spiritual means in scriptures before Abhinavagupta. Of the greatest importance for Abhinavagupta were the assessments of reasoning in his most revered Trika scripture, the Malinivijaya Tantra. This scripture itself tantricizes Indian academic traditions in explaining the soteriological role of reasoning as the discrimination which encourages the movement from that which is to be abandoned (heya)to that which is to be pursued (upadeya).
[71] In his sakta upaya, Abhinavagupta identifies these two categories, respectively, with the impure and pure kinds of conceptualization. Now, the distinguishing characteristic which makes one pure rather than the other is whether or not there is apprehended the absorption of the objective universe into the emanatory subject: The impurity called supreme is the idea which distinguishes from Siva these [things] which really have Him as their nature. Purity is the destruction of this idea.... [72] As the goal of this process, Abhinava posits a principle found in a number of Saiva cosmological schemes. This is none other than the conception with which we are already familiar, Pure Wisdom, that is, the awareness of emanation expressed "I am this [universe] ." [73] Abhinava also identifies this goal of Pure Wisdom with the tool leading toward it, good reasoning: "Good reasoning is nothing but Pure Wisdom... ." [74] Pure Wisdom may thus be understood as the insight that informs, and leads toward itself, the purification of conceptualization. The following passage gives an idea of the overall process: The multitude of things appear clearly in that jewel [the Self/Lord], who is pure, and has omnipotent freedom [svatantra] . That [conceptual construction] is said to be benighted [and is impure] which comprehends differentiation between [those things] and the Self. However [there is also conceptual construction] having the nature of Pure Wisdom, which comprehends the Self as containing all objects [as is expressed]: "I am all this." This conceptual construction has the nature of Pure Wisdom and is clearly manifest; it destroys the mayic conceptual construction which causes differentiation.
[75] Thus we see that both formulations of the Pratyabhijna inferential rationale are also the central practical themes of the sakta upaya. I do not wish to claim, however, that the upaya is nothing but the inference. The two methodological themes in the sakta upaya include a variety of other practices, including nonphilosophical studies of sacred scriptures and discussions of them with gurus, and elaborate meditations on mandalas. Abhinava formulates the upaya to encompass the Pratyabhijna argumentation along with these other practices.
[76] Positive Formulations of Methodology: (d)The Philosophical and Tantric Encounter with Doubt. We may now more briefly consider the Pratyabhijna thinkers' appropriation of one other Nyaya category, that of doubt (samsaya).According to Nyaya, philosophy proceeds by first considering doubt or indecision regarding a view. It then utilizes the inference for the sake of others and other procedures of debate to reach a justified decision (nirnaya).
[77] Most Indian philosophical texts are structured as a series of statements, questions, and answers expressing the views of opponents (purvapaksa--the 'prima facie')in confrontation with the position being established (siddhanta--the 'established conclusion'). In the IPK and its commentaries, the whole second chapter is devoted to an initial presentation of the views of opponents. The discussions are developed further as the proponents argue their response in the remainder of the book. The Nyaya requirement for the consideration of doubt may be taken as coming from the cognizance of the integrality of "otherness" to philosophical rationality. The effort to justify one's views, or to make their ostensible validity more universally intelligible, requires an awareness of alternative possibilities. Abhinavagupta again is explicit about the intelligibility accomplished through the effort of answering doubt: The nature of Ultimate Reality here [in this system] is explained through the consideration of the views of opponents as doubts and the refutation of them; it is thus very clearly manifested.
[78] Given the Saivas' redemptive-apologetic project, it should not be surprising that they do not understand alternative views as truly viable options. They attempt to reencompass the otherness of philosophical opposition within their traditional categories. This is illustrated by Abhinavagupta's benedictory verse to the chapter presenting the views of the opponents: We pay obeisance to Siva, who manifests the differentiated universe as the prima facie argument, and then leads it back to unity as the established conclusion.
[79] Here Abhinava is interpreting the process of philosophical debate with the mythical understanding that the Lord produces both delusion and revelation for humanity. Shortly after this benediction, Abhinavagupta quotes for support a statement from a devotional work, the Stavacintamani of Bhatta Narayana, which more generally describes these acts: Homage to God [deva] who creating the delusion of the deluded who are within worldly existence, destroys it; and concealing the transoppositional bliss of cognition, uncovers it.
[80] We know that Siva ultimately does everything. Nevertheless, corresponding to the mythical identification, the elimination of philosophical opposition is also encompassed within tantric practice. Thus in Abhinava's discussions of the sakta upaya, he polemically makes opponent doctrines an object of the purification of conceptualization. He states that the path to be abandoned [heya] In one of his final comments in the IPV, Abhinava asserts that the Pratyabhijna sastra makes the views of various other systems help bring about the recognition of the Self, as the sun unites the essences (rasa)of earth and water for the nourishment of grains.
[85] From the Saivas' point of view, they are purifying conceptualizations to reflect their tantric metaphysics. This self-understanding also has a rhetorical consequence. As will be illustrated in the next section, the Saivas' arguments attempt thoroughly to subvert the views of their opponents in establishing their own. The Implementation of Tantric Argument The explanation of the Pratyabhijna methodology that has just been given has been confined to formulations of a programmatic nature. To understand it more deeply, we must turn to their technical philosophical discussions. It is not possible to present a detailed analysis of such discussions here. I will only give an overview of the chief implementation of the Saiva method in the arena of epistemology, that is, the philosophy of the recognition of the Lord.
[86] The Challenge of the Buddhist Logicians. Following protocol, we must first turn to the challenge of the Saivas' opponents. Though they deal with various rivals, the Saivas' chief opponents are the school now often called "Buddhist logic," which was founded by Dignaga and most influentially interpreted by Dharmakirti.
[87] Buddhist logic develops two soteriological emphases of early Buddhism--on the transitoriness of all things and on the dangers inherent in speculation--into a critical philosophy that has often been compared with the phenomenalism of David Hume. Buddhist logic formulates a radical distinction and disaccord between (1) a series of evanescent flashes of direct perception lacking all conceptualization (nirvikalpakajnana) --ofevanescent svalaksanas, 'self-characterized', 'unique particulars', or 'point instants' and (2) cognition, which includes vikalpa (i.e., savikalpakajnana), that is, all imaginative, conceptual, and linguistic interpretation, which synthesizes the unique particulars into ostensible objects characterized by universals (samanyalaksana) .Now, while the Buddhists acknowledge that this interpretation has a kind of provisional validity for ordinary behavior in the world, they contend that it is ultimately unfounded in immediate experience and is invalid. [88] In polemics spanning several centuries before the Pratyabhijna sastra, the Buddhist logicians attempted to refute or "deconstruct" as invalid generalizations of evanescent experiences many of the commonsensical and religiously significant conceptions held by the Hindu schools--external objects, ordinary as well as ritual action, an enduring Self, God, the sacred language of revelation, and so forth. A particular development in the debates was crucial in defining the immediate intellectual problematics which the Pratyabhijna thinkers attempted to resolve in their philosophical theology. The entire process of interpreting experience came to be viewed by both Buddhists and Hindus to be epitomized in the experience of recognition (pratyabhijna). Recognition in ordinary life is understood as the realization that an object of a present experience is the same as an object of a past experience, as retained in the memory. It has the typical expression "This is that." The same process actually occurs in all applications of interpretation to experience. In our memory are stored the semantic conventions (samketa)regarding the words that we use in interpretation. We apply interpretations to experience when the relevant mnemonic impressions (samskara) are activated. Thus, all applications of interpretation, which in contemporary Western philosophy are described as "seeing as, " came to be understood as comprising the "This is that" structure of a very general sort of recognition.
[89] The Buddhists claimed that this process of recognition is invalid. They argued that memory has no epistemic relevance to present direct experience. Their most energetic Hindu opponents, the realist schools of Nyaya-Vaisesika and Purva Mimamsa, argued that our recognitive seeing-as is grounded in, and elucidates, a world of genuinely independent objects possessing intrinsic qualities.
[90] Now it is possible to appreciate why the Saivas formulate the soteriological realization that they wish to convey as a kind of recognition. They deliberately set it up as having the recognitive structure of interpretation that has been problematized by the Buddhists. In this regard, I must also point out that in Indian philosophy inference itself, as an interpretation, was understood to operate through a kind of recognitive judgment (lirigaparamarsa, pratisamdhana) . Inference is the application of the knowledge--or memory--of a concomitance to a case presently at hand. [91] For the Pratyabhijna, we have a memory from scriptures and other sources of the Lord Siva as causing the emanation of the universe, possessing Sakti, and so on. One applies this memory to the direct experience of one's own self, as is expressed in the statement "Indeed I am that very Lord." [92] The Saivas' interpretation of the challenge of the Buddhists to their soteriological recognition is oriented toward the structure of the Pratyabhijna inference for the sake of others.
[93] The Buddhists attack the overarching recognition by attacking the recognitions of the inference's key terms along with their entailments: Self; Cognition as a faculty, which it must be to be a Sakti; Action as enduring process, again which it must be to be a Sakti; and the very possibility of relation, which Cognition and Action would have to have with the Self in order to be Saktis. The Buddhist contention is that, as there are no grounds for recognizing these categories in the flux of unique particulars, there are no grounds for the Saiva soteriological recognition.
[94] The Saiva Response to the Buddhists. How do the Saivas answer this sweeping doubt, metaphysically subvert Buddhist logic, and establish the inference leading to the soteriological recognition? Their response may be understood as a highly creative development of the thought of the fourth-to-sixthcentury linguistic philosopher Bhartrhari. [95] Bartrhari had interpreted the Vedic revelation metaphysically as the Word Absolute (sabdabrahman) or Supreme Speech (paravak) . [96] This principle is a superlinguistic plenum containing language and reality in a unity and emanating into the universe of separated words and objects. Bhartrhari's postulation of this principle as the source makes the entire universe of experience inherently linguistic, and thus provides the ground for the re-connection of words and objects in conventional linguistic reference.
[97] His basic position is diametrically opposed to that of the Buddhists.
[98] Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta interpret Supreme Speech as Siva's very self-recognition (ahampratyavamarsa) .
[99] Extending Bhartrhari's approach to the new problematics, they explain their cosmogonic myth of Siva emanating the universe through Sakti as this process of His self-recognition. As Abhinavagupta puts it: The Supreme Lord, who has the nature of awareness, makes His own Self into an object of cognition, even though it is not an object of cognition, because the Cognizer is unitary.... As He recognitively apprehends [paramrsati] His Self, so, because everything is contained within Him, He appears as blue, and so on. [100] The emanation of the recognitions of discrete objects such as "blue" is understood as a kind of fragmentation of the Lord's self-recognition. In this process, there is first the pure monistic self-recognition "I." Then there is a recognition involving a partial differentiation of objectivity from subjectivity, having the structure we know as Pure Wisdom, that is, "I am this." Finally, there is the loss of the awareness of the "I" in the recognition of apparently separate objects as "This," or, more fully, "This is that," "This is blue," and so on.
[101] Siva's self-recognition is, of course, the very realization that the Saivas aim to convey to humanity. The Pratyabhijna thinkers' ascription of a primordial, cosmogonic status to it is of great import in their arguments with the Buddhists. They are thereby able to argue that their system's goal constitutes the very facts that the Buddhists say preclude it. As the Saivas' speculation alleges the necessity of the Lord's self-recognition as the underlying reality of the basic epistemological and ontological facts, it may be classified as a highly ambitious form of transcendental inquiry.
[102] According to the Saivas, just as the Lord's self-recognition emanates into the recognitions of apparently discrete objects, it emanates into different types of experiences of such objects. The chief among these are perceptual cognition, memory, and conceptual exclusion (apohana).In their treatment of epistemology, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta attempt to reduce these processes as well as their ostensible objects to modalities of Siva's self-recognition.
[103] Here it will be possible to give a brief summary of the Saivas' treatment of only one topic of epistemology, which, I believe, is most representative: perceptual cognition. The Saivas' arguments on perceptual cognition may be roughly divided into those centered on the term prakasa and those centered on the term vimarsa and its cognates such as pratyavamarsa, paramarsa, and so on. Though contemporary scholarship has given much attention to these terms, I do not believe there has been a basic appreciation of the way the discussions employing them function to articulate the Saivas' argumentative and rederuptive agendas of leading students to the soteriological recognition.
[104] Prakasa, 'light, illumination' or 'awareness', has the philosophical significance, preliminary to the Saivas' arguments about it, of a kind of subjective awareness that validates each cognition, so that one knows that one knows.
[105] The thrust of the arguments about prakasa is idealistic.
[106] The Saivas contend that, as no object is known without this validating subjective awareness, this awareness constitutes all objects: If the object did not have the nature of awareness [prakasa] , it would be without illumination [aprakasa] , as it was before [its appearance]. Awareness [prakasa] cannot be different [than the object]. Awareness [prakasata] is the essential nature of the object.
[107] Nor can objects external to awareness be inferred as the causes of the diversity of awareness. For inference can only be made regarding things which have already been experienced, and not objects which by definition can never have been experienced.
[108] Furthermore, the Saivas contend that one could never experience another subject outside one's own awareness. However, their conclusion is not solipsism as usually understood in the West, but a conception of a universal awareness: Even the cognition of others is nothing but one's own Self. Otherness is entirely due to accidental attributes [upadhi] such as the body, and so on. And that [an accidental attribute such as the body] has been determined not to be other [than awareness]. Thus everything falls under the category of the subject. The subject is really unitary. And He alone exists.... Therefore, beginning with "Bhagavan Sadasiva cognizes" and ending with "The worm cognizes"--there is only one subject. Consequently, all cognitions [by apparently different subjects really] belong to that [one] subject.
[109] The term vimarsa and its cognates have the significance of a judgment with a recognitive structure.
[110] The arguments centering on these terms develop earlier considerations of Bhartrhari on the linguisticality of experience. They refute the Buddhist contention that recognition is just a contingent reaction to direct experience, by claiming that it is integral or transcendental to it. As Utpala explains: They attest that recognitive judgment [vimarsa] is the essential nature of awareness [avabhasa] . Otherwise, awareness [prakasa] , even though colored [upararakta] by the object, would be like that which is insentient, such as a crystal, and so on. [111] Among the considerations the Saivas adduce for this thesis are: that children must build upon a subtle form of linguistic judgment in their learning of conventional language; that there must be a recognitive ordering of our most basic experiences of situations and movements in order to account for our ability to perform rapid behaviors; and that some kind of subtle application of language in all experiences is necessary in order to account for our ability to remember them.
[112] The Saivas further elaborate their position on the transcendental nature of recognition against the Buddhists by inverting the latters' point of view on the epistemic statuses of universals and particulars. The Saivas make the recognition of universals primary, and hold that particulars are constructed at a secondary level through the synthesis of these syntheses. As Abhinava puts it briefly in the course of discussing another issue: It has been explained here [in the Pratyabhijna] that objects are nothing but manifestations. They are sometimes mixed, through the unification of recognitive judgment [paramarsa], when they have the form of the particular. And sometimes they are recognitively judged [paramrsyante] as unmixed, when they have the form of the universal. [113] In this explanation, the Saivas attempt to achieve a double victory. The perceptions of both sorts of entities are claimed to depend intimately on conceptualization, especially that alleged by the Buddhists to be of the most basic and discrete sense data. Now, neither the arguments about prakasa nor those about vimarsa and its cognates are meant to stand alone. The idealistic prakasa arguments make the recognition shown by the vimarsa arguments to be integral to all epistemic processes, constitutive of them and their objects. The following statement places vimarsa in the idealistic algebra: Here, as the multiplicity of things are recognitively apprehended [vimrsyate] , so they exist [asti] . This is so because Being [astitva] depends upon awareness [prakasa] . That is, there is the manifestation of Being as depending on the recognitive judgment [vimarsa] regarding what is brought about through this awareness [prakasa] .... Therefore, something exists as much and in whatever way it is recognitively apprehended [vimrsyate] and unsublated.[114] Several points must now be spelled out. Since according to the prakasa arguments all experience belongs to one subject, this recognition must be His self-recognition. And, inasmuch as this self-recognition is the means by which Siva causes the emanation of the universe, it is none other than His Sakti. This identity of self-recognition and Sakti is stated very frequently: The Sakti which is Creatorhood [kartrtva] , which has the nature of Lordship, contains all the Saktis. That [Sakti] has the nature of recognitive judgment [vimarsa] . Therefore it is proper that only it is predominant.... As He recognitively apprehends [paramrsati] His Self, so, because everything is contained within Him, He appears as [objects such as] blue, and so on.
[115] Sakti is, of course, also the reason term in the Saiva inference. In the following passage, Utpala thus places the two chief Saktis of Cognition and Action, interpreted in terms of recognition, in the position of inferential reason: He [the subject] is the Great Lord since it is necessarily the case that he is recognitively judging [vimarsattvena niyatena] , and since that very re-cognitive judgment [vimarsa] is the pure Cognition and Action of God [deva] . [116] We are led to the startling realization that selfrecognition, the thesis-goal of the Saiva's inferential-ritual methodology, is identical with the reason that justifies it. That is, one is inferentially led to the recognition that one is the Lord, because everything is one's self-recognition. This may be put another way. The Pratyabhijna treatments of perceptual cognition along with other topics of epistemology may be understood as a recovery or reintegration of the Lord's selfrecognition, which has been fragmented into the recognitions constituting ordinary experience. The following terse statement by Abhinavagupta elucidates as such both key formulations of the inferential rationale and the sakta upaya modus operandi, that is, the revealing of Sakti and the operation of Pure Wisdom/Good Reasoning in purifying conceptualization: The ascertainment [adhyavasa] judges [paramsanti] [117] word and object, characterized by name and form, as one, in the form "This is that." [That ascertainment] is the Sakti of the Supreme Lord, who has the nature of recognitive judgment [vimarsa] . It appears only "as the Self," that is, nonseparately from "I." However, it never appears as "this," that is, as separate [from the Self]. [118] The recognition of an objective "This"/"This is that" is really the emanatory selfrecognition "I." This fact may be expressed either as "'This' is Sakti" or with the expression of Pure Wisdom "I am this."[119] The primordial status accorded to selfrecognition in the interpretation of Saiva emanationism has defined the radical conclusion of it's transcendental inquiry. It is the fact that the Pratyabhijna theory of recognition so fully encodes the Saiva myth that makes the inquiries that disclose it into tantric ritual that bestows salvation. Our discovery of the identity of the reason and conclusion of the Pratyabhijna inference brings us back to the overarching theological negations we considered at the beginning of the discussion of methodology. I there explained the Saivas' understanding of the Lord's ultimate nonobjectifiability in terms of their conceptions of grace and self-luminosity. Abhinava gives these ideas another important articulation in his works on practical theology. Above his threefold scheme of increasingly subtle and internal means, he postulates what he calls the "nonmeans" (anupaya).This is a final stage of immediate realization involving no effort or very slight effort. Some of Abhinava's remarks in his discussion of this nonmeans are directly pertinent to our present consideration of the steps of the Pratyabhijna inference. More fundamental than but homologous to the identity of inferential reason and conclusion is Abhinavagupta's denial here of the ultimate validity of any relation between a distinct spiritual means (upaya)and goal (upeya): The relation of means [upaya] [prakasa] . [121] It is the Lord's omnipotence and self-luminous unity that preclude all relationships of distinct means and the goal. This general conception of practical theology is exemplified in the identity of reason and conclusion in the Pratyabhijna inference. From a philosophical point of view, the identity of reason and conclusion in the Pratyabhijna inference may seem to admit a vitiating circularity. Though this essay is not strictly philosophical, even its exegetic project requires that I say that I do not believe this is so. For, in the Pratyabhijna, the soteriology is not presumed but is supposed to be discovered in inquiries into common problems and following common rules of Sanskrit philosophical discourse. The Saivas' development of these inquiries required an enormous amount of creative interpretation and hard "methodologically detached" thinking. In effect, all these inquiries that they have developed constitute "reasons for the reason" that is emanation/self-recognition. From our extratraditional perspective, the circularity of the inference is thus transformed into a cognitively advancing hermeneutic circularity. It is only within the intratraditional perspective that the elaborate argumentation of Pratyabhijna sastra does not do anything. We must recur to the monistic mythical dynamics of emanation and return. Utpaladeva describes the soteriological reintegration of self-recognition through the Pratyabhijna system as a sort of "telos" of the phenomena of ordinary experience: The accomplishment of the purpose , at the root of a tree, is explained to be created as expectant of that [final point of rest].... Thus also blue, and so on, existing in the intermediate recognitive judgment [paramarsa] as "This is blue," are established to cnsist of the Self. For they rest upon the root recognitive judgment [paramarsa] "I." [123] The new Saiva philosophy, with all of its technical procedure of justification, is a path of return in a circular journey that never really departs. [124] NOTES This essay develops one of the themes in my "Argument and the Recognition of Siva: The Philosophical Theology of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1992 ). An earlier version of this essay was presented in the session "Encoding and Overcoding in the Tantras" at the 22d Annual Conference on South Asia, Madison, 1993 Myth and Philosophy, . One of the greatest pioneers of comparative philosophy, Bimal Krishna Matilal, did do some interpretation of religion, particularly in his later years. However, most of his work has the form described. Thus, see his most important study, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) . One of the most outspoken advocates of the seriousness of Indian philosophies, Daya Krishna, has claimed that their expressed religious objectives are an excuse to legitimate intellectual speculations. 5. See Pierre Hadot, Exercices spirituels etphilosophie antique (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1981). 6. David Tracy is an heir to the tradition of Christian philosophical theology who has made great efforts to develop it to address contemporary problems of interpretation and rationality. See his analysis of the different types of philosophical and nonphilosophical theological discourse in The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 47-98. I will refer to this analysis in interpreting the Pratyabhijna philosophy below. Also see David Tracy, "The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: Catholic Theological Method, Modernity, and Post-Modernity," Theological Studies 50 (1989): 548-570. 7. Scholars making such efforts are as diverse as Bimal Krishna Matilal, Michael Hayes, Paul Griffiths, Robert Neville, and Tu Wei-ming. 8. The main textual focus of this essay will be Utpaladeva's Isvarapratyabhijnakarika (IPK) and Abhinavagupta's Isvarapratyabhijnavimarsini (IPV). For these texts I will use the edition Isvarapratyabhijnavimarsini of Abhinavagupta, Doctrine of Divine Recognition: Sanskrit Text with Bhaskari, 2 vols., ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer and K. C. Pandey (reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986 ). I will sometimes refer to the eighteenth-century commentary on the IPV, Bhaskari, by Bhaskara (BIPV). Also within the essay's scope are: Utpaladeva, Siddhitrayi and the Isvarapratyabhijnakarikavrtti, ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 34 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, 1921) , and Abhinavagupta, Isvarapratyabhijnavivrtivirnarsini, 3 vols., ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies (reprint, Delhi: Akay Book Corporation, 1987) . The Isvarapratyabhijnakarikavrtti and Isvarapratyabhijnavivrtivimarsini will henceforth be referred to as IPKV and IPVV, respectively. This essay will for the most part treat the Pratyabhijna theories of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta as an integral whole. As is usual in foundational verse and aphorism texts, Utpaladeva's IPK is densely written and is intended to be expounded in subordinate commentaries. However, there is presently available only the shorter of Utpaladeva's commentaries, centered on the IPK the IPKV--which is mostly concerned with clarifying the basic meaning of the verses. Abhinavagupta's commentaries have the quality of deep and original thought, but it is most often impossible to distinguish arguments which had direct precedent in Utpaladeva from
